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This article argues that an original debate over the relationship between time and the 
intellect took place in Northern Italy in the second half of the sixteenth century, which 
was part of a broader reflection on the temporality of human mental acts. While human 
intellectual activity was said to be ‘above time’ during the Middle Ages, Renaissance 
scholars such as Marcantonio Genua (1491–1563), Giulio Castellani (1528–1586), Antonio 
Montecatini (1537–1599) and Francesco Piccolomini (1520–1604), greatly influenced by 
the Simplician and Alexandrist interpretations of Aristotle’s works, proposed alterna-
tive conceptions based on the interpretation of De anima 3.6 (430b 7–20) according to 
which intellectual acts happen in a both ‘undivided’ and ‘divisible time’. In order to 
explain Aristotle’s puzzling claim, they were led to conceive of intellectual activity as a 
process similar to sensation, corresponding to a certain lapse of time (Castellani), an 
instant (Montecatini), or a mix of instantaneousness and concrete duration (Picco-
lomini), depending on their theoretical options.
Keywords
Alexandrianism – Aristotelian psychology – De Anima – Giulio Castellani – duration 
– immortality of the soul – eveternity – Marcantonio Genua – instant – indivisibles – 
intellect – Antonio Montecatini – Neoplatonism – Francesco Piccolomini – time
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 15 | doi 10.1163/15733823-00201p01
Early Science and Medicine 20 (2015) 1-26
ISSN 1383-7427 (print version) ISSN 1573-3823 (online version) ESM 1
www.brill.com/esm
2 Dubouclez
Early Science and Medicine 20 (2015) 1-26
1 Introduction
The notion of an ‘intellectual time’ or a ‘time of the intellect’ seems problem-
atic and in some respects self-contradictory within the Aristotelian framework 
of Renaissance philosophy. How could a notion that is inextricable from mat-
ter and physical motion be applied to intellectual acts? From the Middle Ages 
 onwards, a radical view developed: like any other immaterial substance, the 
intellect must be said to be supra tempus – ‘above time,’ as Thomas Aquinas 
(1225–1274) states in accordance with the Liber de causis.1 Christian theolo-
gians, however, typically ascribed a specific duration to the intellectual activity 
of angels, which characterised it as a discrete succession of thoughts with no 
relationship whatsoever to the continuous time of natural substances.2 The 
thirteenth-century philosopher Giles of Rome (1247–1316) made the sugges-
tion that, in some way, the operations of our intellect may be analogous to an-
gelic thought: “From things we see in our mind, he observes, a way is wide open 
to investigate that angelic time.”3 But this analogy did not result in a clear con-
ception of human intellectual time, as Carlos Steel remarks: “The medieval au-
thors never admit that the discrete time is also applicable to the cognitive 
activities of the human souls. In their view those souls share in their activities 
the same measure of duration as all the physical events in the sublunary 
realm.”4 If Heavenly intellects are subsumed under ævum or eveternity, the de-
pendency on phantasia, which is typical of human life, connects our intelli-
gence and its successive operations to the bodily motions of the outer world. 
As a result, the human intellect has an indirect relationship to time – ‘per ac-
cidens’ in Aquinas’ words –, namely through phantasmata derived from sen-
sible things: angels, however, know a kind of duration that is intrinsic to their 
intellectual activity.5
1 See for instance Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiæ, Ia, q. 85, art. 4, Opera Omnia, ed. Leon. 
5 (Rome, 1889), 81, and I-IIæ, q. 113, art. 7, OO, ed. Leon. 7 (Rome, 1892), 339. On the Liber de 
causis, see La Demeure de l’être: autour d’un anonyme. Étude et traduction du Liber de causis, 
ed. Pierre Magnard, Olivier Boulnois, Bruno Pinchard and Jean-Luc Solère (Paris, 1990), 42.
2 On angelic time, see Richard Cross, “Angelic Time and Motion: Bonaventure to Duns Scotus,” 
in A Companion to Angels in Medieval Philosophy, ed. Tobias Hoffmann (Leiden 2011), 117–47, 
at 126–29.
3 Giles of Rome, De Mensura Angelorum (Venice, 1503), 74: “Per ea quæ videmus in mente nos- 
tra … habemus magnam viam ad investigandum de tempore illo angelico.” Quoted by Carlos 
Steel, “The Neoplatonic Doctrine of Time and Eternity and Its Influence on Medieval 
Philosophy,” in The Medieval Concept of Time: Studies on the Scholastic Debate and Its Reception 
in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Pasquale Porro (Boston 2001), 24.
4 Steel, “The Neoplatonic Doctrine of Time,” 23–24.
5 Aquinas, Opera Omnia, ed. Leon. 7, 339: “Mens autem humana quæ justificatur, secundum se 
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The idea that a faculty can have a nature different to that of its opera- 
tions – for instance, that the intellect can be atemporal while its operations, 
because of their link to material objects, are temporal – was challenged by fol-
lowers of Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525), in the larger context of the revival of 
Alexandrist conceptions of the soul in Northern Italy. It is well known that the 
Pomponazzi affair produced an important shift in psychology and anthropol-
ogy at the beginning of the sixteenth century. In his De immortalitate animæ of 
1516, Pomponazzi infers from the human mind’s dependency on phantasms 
that, even in the case of self-reflection, ‘intelligere est cum continuo & tempore’. 
He also contrasts human intellection with the atemporal activity of separated 
substantial forms.6 Simone Porzio (1496–1554), an enthusiastic reader of Alex-
ander of Aphrodisias and professor of philosophy and medicine in Pisa and 
Naples, went even further in his De mente humana disputatio of 1551 where he 
strongly opposed the idea that the intellect might be connected to phantasms 
without being itself corruptible and mortal.7 Porzio’s overall psychology was 
‘mortalist’: he understood Aristotle’s entelecheia as meaning “the perfection 
and final end reached through a motion” and assimilated intellection with “a 
natural motion, through which a form was moved from one subject to the 
 other.” 8 A direct consequence of this naturalistic conception of the soul was to 
quidem est supra tempus, sed per accidens subiditur tempori: inquantum scilicet intelligit 
cum continuo et tempore secundum phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles considerat, 
ut in Primo dictum est. Et ideo judicandum est, secundum hoc, de ejus mutatione secundum 
conditionem temporalium motuum”. See also the princeps thomistarum, John Capreolus 
(1380–1444), In II sent. (Venice 1589), 106: “Sic intellectiones nostræ, quia sunt termini extrin-
seci fantasiationum, dependent quodamodo a motu & tempore primi mobilis, & mensurantur 
tali mensura exteriori.” Even when Thomas Aquinas apparently deals with a purely psychical 
duration in his De Instantibus, he ultimately relies on its relationship to phantasmata. See 
Jean-Luc Solère, “Descartes et les discussions médiévales sur le temps,” in Descartes et le Moyen 
Age, ed. Joël Biard and Roshdi Rashed (Paris, 1997), 329–48, at 338–39.
6 Pietro Pomponazzi, De immortalitate animæ (n.p., 1534), 59–60: “In omni namque quantum-
cunque abstracta cognitione idolum aliquod corporale sibi format, propter quod humanus 
intellectus primo & directe non intelligit se, componitque & discurrit: quare suum intelligere 
est cum continuo & tempore, cuius totum oppositum contingit in intelligentiis quæ sunt 
penitus liberatæ a materia.”
7 On Alexandrianism and Pomponazzi, see Craig Martin, Subverting Aristotle. Religion, History, 
and Philosophy in Early Modern Science (Baltimore, 2014), 62–64.
8 Eckhard Kessler, “Psychology: the Intellective Soul,” in The Cambridge History of Renaissance 
Philosophy, ed. Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler and Jill Kraye (Cambridge, 
1988), 520. Kessler comments on Porzio’s De humana mente disputatio (Florence, 1551), 9. For 
a larger investigation on Porzio’s philosophy and career, see Eva del Soldato, Simone Porzio: 
un aristotelico tra natura e grazia (Rome, 2010).
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undermine the idea that the human intellect was eternal or independent from 
time. Porzio indeed insists in his Disputatio that human activities are inevita-
bly subject to birth and death, interruption and corruption, including the no-
blest of them.9 According to him, all the immaterial aspects of thought are to 
be referred to an immaterial agent, God, while the human intellect, identified 
with the Aristotelian ‘possible intellect,’ is both passive and corruptible.10
Whereas Porzio does not give a detailed treatment of the relationship be-
tween time, duration and the human mind, other Italian scholars did tackle 
this issue. They asked whether the human intellect operates within time and to 
what extent intellection can be regarded as an inherently temporal process. 
The rejection of the immortality of the soul had suddenly opened a new per-
spective on Aristotelian accounts of time, since the soul was no longer consid-
ered as a separated substance but instead as a form deeply involved in matter 
and subject to change. Michael Edwards has recently suggested that the read-
ing and interpretation of a somewhat obscure passage of De Anima, namely 
chapter 6 of book 3, played an important role in early modern debates over 
intellectual time.11 But this passage seems to have received careful attention as 
early as the 1550s when, under the influence of Porzio or in reaction to his ma-
terialistic psychology, an effort was made to clarify Aristotle’s assertions. 
Among the most significant positions developed were those of Marcantonio 
Genua (1491–1563), Giulio Castellani (1528–1586), Antonio Montecatini (1537–
1599) and Francesco Piccolomini (1520–1604). Genua, Montecatini and Picco-
lomini were professors of natural philosophy: Genua and Piccolomini at the 
University of Padua. Montecatini, who was also an important political figure, 
taught at the University of Ferrara.12 A former student of the universities of 
Ferrara, Bologna and Padua, Castellani was appointed professor of philosophy 
9 Porzio, De humana mente, 24: “Licet mihi mentis humanæ æternitatem investigare: pro-
culdubio nulla est quæ æternitatem eius probet, quoniam si mentem humanam, ut for-
mam & ut motorem accipimus, cum formæ conditiones ex functionibus & actionibus 
cognoscantur ; nulla prorsus est in homine motio aut operatio quæ continua & perennis 
sit, sed omnes quiete intercipiuntur & abolentur. Intellectio, si quidem marescit, pereunt 
scientiæ, opiniones, appetitiones, progressiones, sensus & nutricationes.”
10 Porzio, De humana mente, 36. See also the whole chapter 7, 34–47.
11 Michael Edwards, “Time, Duration and the Soul in Late Aristotelian Natural Philosophy 
and Psychology,” in Psychology and the Other Disciplines: A Case of Cross-Disciplinary 
Interaction (1250–1750), ed. Paul J. J. M. Bakker, Sander W. de Boer and Cees Leijenhorst 
(Leiden, 2012), 117. See also Michael Edwards, Time and the Science of the Soul in Early 
Modern Philosophy (Leiden, 2013), 78–79.
12 See Paul F. Grendler, The Universities of the Italian Renaissance (Baltimore, 2002).
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at the Sapienza at the end of his career.13 As we shall see, he played a crucial 
role in the development of the whole debate.
2 The Aristotelian Concept of ‘Indivisible Time’
The Aristotelian definition of time focuses on physical motion: time is con-
ceived in the Physics as the quantifiable aspect of motion with respect to be-
fore and after. It is well known that this conception was strongly criticized by 
Renaissance authors as diverse as Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499), Bernardino 
Telesio (1509–1588), Giordano Bruno (1548–1600) and Francesco Patrizi (1529–
1597), but little is known about discussions regarding other aspects of the Aris-
totelian conception of time, particularly its relationship to the human mind.14 
In a famous passage of the fourth book of the Physics, Aristotle not only says 
that the intellect numbers time, but he also seems to attribute an ontological 
significance to that operation:
And if nothing can count except consciousness, and consciousness only 
as intellect (not a sensation merely), it is impossible that time should 
exist if consciousness did not; unless the ‘objective thing’ which is subjec-
tively time to us, if we may suppose that movement could thus objec-
tively exists without there being any consciousness (Physics 4.14, 223a 
15–28).
Unfortunately, except for those sketchy indications, Aristotle does not say any-
thing about the temporal nature of the intellective operations. His circumspec-
tion renders the treatment of intellectual time in De Anima 3.6 all the more 
significant. The text of this passage is as follows:
Since the term indivisible (adiairéton) has two senses – potential or 
actual – there is nothing to prevent the mind from thinking of the indivis-
ible when it thinks of length (which is in actuality undivided), and that in 
indivisible time (en chronô adiairétô).15 Time is also both divisible and 
indivisible in the same sense as length. So it is impossible to say what it 
13 See Charles B. Schmitt, “Castellani, Giulio,” in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, 80 vols. 
(Rome 1925–2014), 21 (1978), 624–25.
14 For a general survey of renaissance theories of time in relation to Aristotle’s philosophy, 
see Sarah Hutton, “Some Renaissance Critiques of Aristotle’s Theory of Time,” Annals of 
Science, 34 (1977), 345–63.
15 The translation of the Greek adiairéton is problematic. Latin writers often translate adiai-
réton as individuum. Ross translates it as ‘unitary’: Aristotle, De anima, ed. David Ross 
(Oxford, 1961), 299–300. Walter S. Hett and Robert D. Hicks use both ‘indivisible’ and 
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was thinking in each half of the time; for the half has no existence, except 
potentially, unless the whole is divided. But by thinking each half sepa-
rately, mind divides the time as well; in which case the halves are treated 
as separate units of length. But if the line is thought of as the sum of two 
halves, it is also thought of in a time that covers both half periods.
 But when the object of thought is not quantitatively but qualitatively 
indivisible, the mind thinks of it in indivisible time, and by an indivisible 
activity of the soul; but incidentally (kata symbébèkôs) this whole is divisi-
ble, not in the sense in which the activity and the time are divisible, but 
in the sense in which they are indivisible; for there is an indivisible ele-
ment even in these, though perhaps incapable of separate existence, 
which makes the time and the length one (De Anima 3.6, 430b 7–20).16
Aristotle is dealing here with a basic operation of the soul, namely the intellec-
tion of indivisibles as opposed to complex notions and judgments that are 
made out of those indivisibles (De Anima 3.6, 430a 26–430b 7).17 Aristotle’s 
claim is that intellectual acts can bear on either divisible or indivisible objects 
but that in all cases the intellect grasps objects as indivisibles: sometimes they 
are ‘undivided’ (for instance, a line thought of as a whole, but still divisible), 
sometimes ‘indivisible’ in the strict sense of the word (for instance, a mathe-
matical point that no operation of the mind can divide).18 From the unity of 
the object considered, it follows that the very act of grasping that object is uni-
tary and that it happens in one time, namely in ‘undivided time’. If a length is 
apprehended by an intellectual act, Aristotle says, one cannot divide the dura-
tion of that intellectual act and distinguish two intervals of time within it cor-
responding to two different parts of that magnitude. The length indeed is taken 
all at once, and no division occurs within the very intellection apprehending 
it. But Aristotle adds something puzzling: although undivided, the time of 
‘undivided’ depending on the context. See Aristotle, De anima, transl. R. D. Hicks (Amster-
dam, 1965), 137.
16 Aristotle, De anima, transl. William S. Hett (London, 1986), 173. For a detailed survey of 
this passage, see Ronald Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima: A Critical Commentary (Cam-
bridge, 2007), 475–77. 
17 See Enrico Berti, “The Intellection of Indivisibles According to Aristotle’s De Anima III.6,” 
in Aristotle on Mind and the Senses, ed. Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd and G. E. L. Owen (Cambridge, 
1978), 141–63; Thomas de Koninck, “La noêsis et l’indivisible selon Aristote,” in La Nais-
sance de la raison en Grèce, ed. J.-F. Mattéi (Paris, 1990), 215–28. See also Michel Fattal, 
“L’intellection des indivisibles dans le De Anima (3, 6) d’Aristote: lectures arabes et mod-
ernes,” in Corps et âme: sur le De Anima d’Aristote, ed. Gilbert Romeyer-Dherbey and Cris-
tina Viano (Paris, 1996), 423–40.
18 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, 5.6, 1016b 25–26.
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 intellection is, in the case of the length, ‘potentially’ divided, which means that 
a division can occur within it. Such a claim is consistent with the declaration 
that time and length are ‘both divisible and indivisible in the same sense’. A 
similar difficulty appears in the second paragraph of the text above: Aristotle 
says that ‘the indivisible activity of the soul,’ although its object is not a quan-
tity but a quality or a form, is ‘incidentally’ divisible or divisible ‘by accident 
(kata symbébèkos)’. Why is there still divisibility in the undivided time of think-
ing? Is there any contradiction in Aristotle’s exposition?
Most ancient and medieval commentators agreed that the expression ‘indi-
visible time’ implied an ‘instant’ or a ‘now’, in accordance with the fourth and 
sixth books of Physics. Whereas “time must be continuous,” that is to say “ca-
pable of being divided into parts that can in their turn be divided again, and so 
on without limit,” (6.2, 232b 25–26) Aristotle says that “there is something per-
taining to time which is indivisible” (6.3, 234a 23–24) and is not a duration but 
a ‘limit’ (4.10, 218a 23–24), namely what he calls a ‘now.’19 The late-antique com-
mentator John Philoponus consequently complained that Aristotle’s vocabu-
lary in De Anima 3.6 was inadequate:20
By an ‘indivisible time’ he means a now, speaking ill. For a now is not a 
time but a beginning of time. By a ‘now’ I mean an instant. But if you take 
the now that has duration, that has a beginning and a limit and is a time. 
But now we are speaking of the instantaneous now.21
19 Averroes and Thomas Aquinas expressly use the word ‘instant’ in their commentaries on 
De Anima. Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia libri de anima, ed. Leon. 45/1 (Rome-Paris, 1984), 
226: “Si autem intelligat lineam sicut unum quid constitutum ex duabus partibus, etiam 
intelliget in tempore non diviso, set secundum aliquid quod est in utrisque partibus tem-
poris, scilicet in instanti, et si continuetur consideratio per aliquod aliud tempus, non 
dividetur tempus ut aliud intelligat in una parte temporis et aliud in alia, set idem in 
utraque”; Averroes, Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, ed. Richard C. Taylor 
and Thérèse-Anne Druart (New Haven, 2009), 368: “Because the time in which it under-
stands and the things which it understands are indivisible in their own right, but they are 
nevertheless in divisible things, namely, the instant in which it understands and the form 
which it understands. For an instant is indivisible and is in time which is divisible.”
20 Or more probably Stephanus of Alexandria. On the authorship of the Commentary on 
Book 3 of De Anima, see ‘Philoponus’, On Aristotle On the Soul 3.1–8, transl. William Charl-
ton (London-New York, 2013), 1–17; Henry Blumenthal, “John Philoponus and Stephanus 
of Alexandria: Two Neoplatonic Christian Commentators on Aristotle?,” in Neoplatonism 
and Christian Thought, vol. 2, ed. Dominic J. O’Meara (Albany, 1982), 54–63.
21 ‘Philoponus’, On Aristotle On the Soul 3.1–8, 129. 
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The beginning of a time indeed is not a time: it is a limit of an interval of time 
and an indivisible moment, as Aristotle explains in Physics 6.5 (235b 30–236a 
7).22 What makes Philoponus so unsatisfied with the expression ‘indivisible 
time’ is that the word ‘time’ should not be used at all in that context: in the 
Aristotelian framework time is divisible by essence.23 An instant is something 
indivisible in time, but it cannot be an indivisible time.
The idea that time and indivisibility are incompatible was further devel-
oped by Renaissance Neoplatonists. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, 
Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples (circa 1450–1537) declared in his Paraphrasis of De 
Anima:
The intellection and the time of intellection are indivisible, if we may call 
‘time’ the duration of intellection. Indeed, truly speaking, the intellect 
understands neither in time nor in a moment or indivisible part of time, 
but either in eveternity or an atom of it.24
This interpretation echoes Marsilio Ficino’s commentary on the Enneads 3.7, 
where he declares that “as the sense acts within time, the intellect acts in eve-
ternity,” rehearsing the Platonic correspondence between eternity and the in-
telligible realm. According to Ficino, ‘touch’ is a common feature of knowledge, 
whether sensitive or intellectual; but the intellect is a better ‘touch’ since “while 
it touches, it is touched in return,” which means that it develops into a separate 
dimension. The activity of the intellect is indeed supposed to develop outside 
the continuous time of human life, while reason, which is a different faculty, is 
viewed as a medium between eternal and sensible things. Ficino claims that 
rational souls are “in eveternity by their essence, and in time by their action 
and motion.”25 Intellection as such pertains to a supernatural kind of duration, 
22 See Physics 4.10, 218a 7–8 and 24–25. See also John Philoponus, Against Proclus On the 
Eternity of the World 1–5, transl. Michael J. Share (London-New York, 2014), 81.
23 In his De Intellectu, Philoponus underlines the same idea. See On Aristotle On the Intellect 
(de Anima 3.4–8), transl. William Charlton (London-New York, 2014), 88: “As it is then with 
the generation of Forms, so it falls out with understanding: intellect understands them 
without taking time, in an instant, by its first intuition. When I understand that the three 
angles of the triangle are equal to two right angles, I do so in an indivisible intuition.”
24 Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples, Totius philosophiae naturalis Paraphrases (Paris, 1501), 347: “Et 
intellectio et intellectionis tempus indivisibile est: si modo intellectionis moram tempus 
appellare liceat. Nam revera nec in tempore nec temporis momento aut impartibili intel-
lectus intelligit: sed aut in ævo aut ejus Atomo.” 
25 Marsilio Ficino, De rebus philosophicis libri LIIII in enneades sex distributi (Cologne, 1540), 
182: “Cognatio igitur intellectus ad propria et æterna eius obiecta maior est quam 
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which is similar to the eveternity that qualifies the time of Heavenly beings. It 
is interesting to note that Giles of Rome had provided a similar interpretation 
of De anima 3.6: Giles’ interpretation was also echoed by Averroist philoso-
phers who wanted to defend the dogma of the immortality of the human soul. 
Agostino Nifo, for instance, quotes Giles in his Expositio subtilissima in tres li-
bros Aristotelis de anima: “The intellect as intellect neither understands in time 
nor in an instant of time, since it stands neither in time nor in a instant of time, 
but it certainly understands in eveternity, as other intelligences do.”26
It seems natural that a Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle would insist 
on the atemporality of the intellect and link it to the soul only insofar as it is 
affected by sensitive things. But it is highly questionable whether such a read-
ing can resolve the philological and philosophical difficulties raised by De ani-
ma 3.6, or whether it can clarify Aristotle’s enigmatic claim that the human 
intellect acts ‘in indivisible time.’
3 The Simplician Trend and Its Criticism in Castellani’s De Humano 
Intellectu (1568)
During the Renaissance, a number of scholars tried hard to solve the difficul-
ties outlined above and give an account of Aristotelian ‘indivisible time.’ Most 
of them, despite being Neoplatonists, were influenced by the revival of the an-
cient commentators (Philoponus, but also Simplicius, Themistius, along with 
Alexander of Aphrodisias) that took place during the Italian cinquecento and 
cognatio sensus ad sentienda: cognatio inquam intelligentiæ mutua, quatenus enim tan-
git, tangit atque vicissim: sicut igitur sensus est, agitque in tempore, sic intellectus in ævo. 
Ratio vero tanquam media est in utroque, nam & æterna tangit & temporalia: medium 
quidem eiusmodi esse potest, nam & cælum est introque: per substantiam in ævo, per 
motum actionemque in tempore. Debet quinetiam universo eiusmodi medium non 
deesse, ut inter res supernas quæ tam actionem quam essentia sunt æternæ: atque inferi-
ores, quæ utrinque sunt temporales, sint rationales animæ: per essentiam quidem in ævo, 
per actionem vero motumque in tempore.”
26 Agostino Nifo, Expositio subtilissima nec non et collectanea commentariaque in tres libros 
Aristotelis de anima (Venice, 1559), 735: “Intellectus ut intellectus nec intelligit in tempore, 
nec in instanti temporis, quia cum non sit in tempore, nec in instanti temporis, sed for-
tasse intelligit in ævo, ut ceteræ intelligentiæ.” The rest of the text confirms the concep-
tion of the intellect as atemporal: “At si intellectus sumatur, ut conversus ad nos, hoc est 
intellectus intelligens mediantibus phantasmatibus aliqua intelligit in instanti, ut cum 
intelligit simplicia, vel indivisibilia, aliqua intelligit in tempore, cum componit & dividit, 
saltem per accidens ratione sensuum, ratione quorum ipse est in tempore” (emphasis 
mine).
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contributed to developing conflicting trends in Aristotelian scholarship. Mar-
cantonio Genua, a representative of Simplician Averroism, expressly rejects 
the Philoponian exegesis of Aristotle’s time of the intellect.27 We have seen in 
the previous section that, for John Philoponus, the term ‘indivisible time’ does 
not mean anything other than ‘instant’ or ‘now’. All things, either continuous 
or not, either quantities or forms, must be grasped in “a now of time (nunc 
temporis)” as Gentian Hervet’s Latin translation says.28 From the Philoponian 
perspective, the distinction between potential and actual divisibility exists 
only to indicate that nothing hinders the human intellect from apprehending 
extended things as actually undivided and “laying hold of composites as 
simples.”29 But that interpretation, Genua objects, “is not consistent with Aris-
totle, since an instant is not a time”. For that reason, the intellection of quanti-
ties cannot be said to be instantaneous:
Moreover, the intellection would not be in conformity with its object and 
measure. Yet the Philosopher expressly states that as the mind appre-
hends the absolutely indivisible in an instant, the dianoia does likewise 
with the actually indivisible, that is to say the continuum, and in an actu-
ally indivisible time. But nevertheless such a time is potentially divisible 
in the same way as the continuum, as Simplicius rightly explains, being 
given that the now of time is both potentially and actually indivisible. 
That is confirmed by the Philosopher when saying that time is divisible 
and indivisible in the same sense as magnitude.30
27 Simplicius was regarded as a major interpreter of Aristotelian philosophy along with 
Averroes. One of Genua’s pupils, also a translator and editor of Simplicius’s works, even 
planned to substitute Simplicius for Averroes in Italy. See Kessler, “The intellective soul,” 
525. See also Leen Spruit, Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge. II. Renais-
sance Controversies, Later Scholasticism and the Elimination of Intelligible Species in Mod-
ern Philosophy (Leiden, 1995), 164–73; on Genua’s influential position and his opponents, 
see 184–86. 
28 John Philoponus, Commentarius in Aristotelis libros tres de Anima (Lyon, 1558), unpagi-
nated.
29 See ‘Philoponus’, On Aristotle On the Soul 3.1–8, 129.
30 Marcantonio Genua, In tres libros Aristotelis de anima exactissimi commentarii (Venice, 
1576), 164: “At expositio ista non stat cum Aristotele, quandoquidem instans tempus non 
sit: modo Philosophus dicit in tempore indivisibili. Præterea intellectio conformis non 
esset ex parte objecti, & mensuræ: quod tamen expresse habetur a Philosopho, ut mens 
de omnino indivisibili, & in instanti; sic & dianoea de actu indivisibili, continuo scilicet, 
& tempore indivisibili actu; & ipso potentia tamen divisibili, ut continuum est, ut recte 
exponit Simplicius quia nunc temporis est potentia, & actu indivisibile. Confirmatur per 
Philosophus, cum dicat: Similiter & tempus divisibile, ac indivisibile magnitudini est.”
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Here, Genua introduces the Platonic distinction between nous and dianoia in 
order to justify the idea that the intellect can take extended things into view. 
While the term nous is used for the immediate apprehension of intelligible no-
tions, dianoia usually designates the faculty for dealing with intelligible no-
tions as they are captured by images existing in space and time. Accordingly, 
since the ‘dianoetica intellectio’31 is an act of the intellect that bears on sense 
data and extended objects, the indivisible time of the intellectual operation is 
potentially divisible and hence is not an ‘instantaneous now’, but rather a cer-
tain lapse of time. In other words, the indivisible time needed to grasp some-
thing that has extension is in fact continuous time, although it is actually not 
divided because it comes with one intellectual act. Genua relies on Simplicius, 
who considers that, compared to contemplating pure and indivisible Forms, 
apprehending continuous things or the limits of continuous things amounts to 
“coming down together with them” or “being co-divided with objects.”32 While 
the thinker totally “remains in himself” and reaches the oneness of eternity 
when apprehending forms, he is bound to decline and operate within time, 
“although an actually undivided time,” when considering quantities.33 Such a 
time, which is likely to become divided, has nothing in common with the “su-
perior now” of contemplation.34 According to Simplicius, the temporal status 
of intellection is “co-ordinate” with its content: “eadem est ratio temporis et ra-
tio intellectæ” as Giulio Pace declared a few decades later.35 The only important 
modification that Genua brings to the Simplician reading is in apparently re-
31 Genua, In tres libros Aristotelis de anima, 164v.
32 ‘Simplicius’, On Aristotle On the Soul 3.6–13, ed. Carlos Steel (London, 2013), 252, 13–23. The 
authorship of the commentary is doubtful; it probably is Priscian of Lydia’s work. See 
Carlos Steel, “The Author of the Commentary On the Soul,” in Priscian, On Theophrastus 
on Sense-Perception, with ‘Simplicius’, On Aristotle On the Soul 2.5–12, transl. Pamela Huby 
and Carlos Steel (London, 1997), 105–40. For a different analysis see Ilsetraut Hadot, “Sim-
plicius or Priscianus? On the Author of the Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima (CAG XI): 
A Methodological Study,” Mnemosyne, 55 (2002), 159–99.
33 On the influence of Simplicius’s commentary on De Anima during the 15th and 16th cen-
turies, see Bruno Nardi, “II commento di Simplicio a De anima nelle controversie della 
fine del secolo XV e del secolo XVI,” in Bruno Nardi, Saggi sull’aristotelismo padovano dal 
secolo XIV al XVI (Florence, 1958), 365–443.
34 ‘Simplicius’, On Aristotle On the Soul 3.6–13, 253, 1–15: “But when it thinks it as undivided, 
then it does so also in an undivided time. And immediately he made plain the inferiority 
of the cognition co-ordinate to these things, for it does not know in the impartible now 
that is superior to all time, if one may call ‘now’ what is superior to all time, but in time, 
although in an actually undivided time.”
35 Aristotle, Aristotelis de anima libri tres, græce et latine, ed. Giulio Pace (Frankfurt, 1596), 
386.
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jecting the notion of an ‘eternal now’: intellection of forms is achieved neither 
in time nor in eternity, as Simplicius argued, but in a moment of time.36
But a problem still remains. If Aristotle employs the expression ‘indivisible 
time’ for the intellection of both forms and quantities, it undoubtedly follows 
that pure intellections should not be called instantaneous either. Simplicius, 
who was aware of that difficulty, developed the following explanation:
Although Aristotle said ‘in time’, he nevertheless added ‘in indivisible’ so 
as to indicate what is above time, ‘for all time is divisible’. Thus, as the 
addition ‘of stone’ in the expression ‘ship made of stone’ destroys its 
being a ship, so also the addition of ‘indivisible’ to time cancels its being 
a time.37
If this is the only way to preserve the intellection of forms from falling into 
time, it seems an almost purely rhetorical strategy! Another solution would be 
to accept the idea that the intellection of forms also happens in continuous 
time. But this move would certainly amount to rejecting the neoplatonic con-
ception of time and the human soul.
Giulio Castellani, faithful for the most part to Porzio’s psychology, embraced 
that position in the late 1550s and offered a viable alternative to the Simplician 
interpretation that gave a new impulse to the debate on the time of the intel-
lect.38 Castellani’s interest in the question of intellectual time seems to ori-
ginate in a quite different context, namely the reading of Nicomachean Ethics 
10.3 (1174a 16–19), where it is claimed that pleasure occurs in an instant.39 
 Castellani first commented on that claim in his Aduersus M. Tullii Ciceronis 
academicas quaestiones disputatio of 1558. Against the theory of pleasure pre-
sented in Porzio’s De Dolore, Castellani follows the fifteenth-century editor and 
36 Genua recalls Themistius’ saying, “Hoc est, ut inquit Themistius, de mirabilibus intellec-
tus; audit in tempore, intelligit autem non in tempore, sed in nunc temporis”: Genua, In 
tres libros Aristotelis de anima, 164v.
37 ‘Simplicius’, On Aristotle On the Soul 3.6–13, 254, 20–23. On ‘lapidea navis’, see also Genua, 
In tres libros Aristotelis de anima, 164v.
38 Kessler, “The Intellective Soul,” 521–22.
39 Giulio Castellani, Aduersus M. Tullii Ciceronis academicas quaestiones disputatio (Bolo-
gna, 1558), 81: “Voluptas … est enim quoddam totum, nulloque in tempore voluptatem 
quispiam accipiet, cuius species, si maior tempore fiat, perficietur.” Pleasure, Aristotle 
says, is “a whole, and one cannot at any moment put one’s hand on a pleasure which will 
only exhibit its specific quality perfectly if its duration be prolonged”: Aristotle, Nicoma-
chean Ethics, transl. Harris Rackham (Cambridge-London, 1994), 591. On this passage of 
the Nicomachean Ethics, see Sarah Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle (Oxford, 1991), 340–43.
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commentator on the Nicomachean Ethics, Donatus Acciaiolus (1429–1478). Ac-
ciaiolus explains that pleasure in Aristotle, far from being the result of a mo-
tion, is always produced “in an instant” or “moment of time,” that is to say 
without any process or delay. Like “the vision of light” or “the representation of 
an image in a mirror” that can be immediately perceived by the beholder, Ac-
ciaiolus says, pleasure happens “tota simul”: it requires no time to be experi-
enced and whenever it has to be prolonged, like a visual image lasting for 
several minutes, it will nonetheless be entirely actualised “in every part and at 
every point” of its duration.40 In Metaphysics 9.6, Aristotle indeed argues that 
vision does not need time to occur. It is immediately completed: “At the same 
time we are seeing and have seen, are understanding and have understood, are 
thinking and have thought,” (1048b 23–24) because the end pursued is entirely 
achieved in the act itself. Present and perfect tenses, Aristotle argues, are there-
fore conjoined in that particular circumstance.41 From that analysis of vision 
and pleasure Castellani coins a distinction that allegedly applies to all the 
“powers of the soul”: a “proper sensible”, insofar as it is known as “delectable”, 
will give birth to a “first generation of pleasure” once it is perceived. Then, that 
first action will be completed by a second action, unfortunately ignored by Ac-
ciaiolus, when the “virtus appetendi” is put into motion and develops into an 
enjoyable movement or activity.42 Castellani distinguishes two modes of plea-
sure, one linked to the reception (suscipere) of ‘species’, the other one to enjoy-
ment (fruor). In the first case, pleasure is a pure sensation; it can affect any 
animal and does not depend on common sense as Porzio unsuccessfully ar-
gues. But Castellani’s claim is that human sensation, when taken as a whole 
and including the second mode of pleasure, inevitably requires awareness as 
40 Aristotelis Ethicorum ad Nicomachum libri decem. Joanne Argyropylo Byzantio interprete 
(Lyon, 1544), 837–38. The comparison of pleasure and vision is also to be found in Castel-
lani, Aduersus M. Tullii Ciceronis academicas quaestiones, 92–93.
41 Aristotle, Metaphysics, transl. David Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan 
Barnes (Princeton, 1991), 1656.
42 Castellani, Aduersus M. Tullii Ciceronis academicas quaestiones, 82–83: “Profecto in volup-
tate (idem autem erit & de dolore iudicium) ut in cæteris rebus, quæ in animæ potestati-
bus subsistunt, duo præsertim expostulantur, a quibus hæc ortum ducit, atque perficitur, 
& ratione quorum eam duobus modis considerare potes. Alterum quidem est, ut in appe-
titus organo rei delectabilis species recipiatur, scilicet ut proprium sensibile cognitum, 
quatenus delectabile est, cum primo concitet, ac deducat in actum. & hic est primus 
voluptatis ortus, qui cum perse non sufficiat, ut ea compleatur, alterum postulat, quod 
quidem est ut appetendi virtus specie iam recepta fruatur, hoc est, hiet, iucundoque quo-
dam motu diffundatur”; Castellani, Aduersus M. Tullii Ciceronis academicas quaestiones, 
84: “Quod minime Acciaiuolus consideravit.”
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well as duration and cannot be simply said to be instantaneous. It is precisely 
in order to justify this assertion that he refers to De Anima 3.6 and engages with 
Aristotle’s subtle distinction between an ‘instant’ and ‘indivisible time’, insist-
ing that our intellect, because it is tied to phantasms, is necessarily entangled 
with temporality.43
Castellani devoted another substantial discussion to this question three 
years later in a chapter of his De humano intellectu (1561) significantly entitled 
“On the triple act of the intellect: that our intellection cannot be achieved in an 
instant, but always requires some time.”44 In this chapter he openly maintains 
the temporal nature of intellectual activity: “Either simply apprehending 
things, or composing and dividing, namely discoursing, intellection demands 
a determinate lapse of time, [it being] given that no action of our intellect can 
be completed within an instant.”45 What Castellani calls an “entirely new and 
amazing opinion” is based, he argues, on textual evidence: “If this undivided 
time in which (as Aristotle said above) a length is perceived as an instant, how 
would it be cut into two parts, since an instant can neither actually nor poten-
tially be cut into parts?”46 We are therefore induced to conclude that “indivis-
ible time” always means “a continuous time which is one in act” or, as Castellani 
also puts it, a “space of time.”47 Intellection may therefore be compared to 
 sensation and imagination as far as their generative process is concerned:
Nobody must be amazed that natural generation happens in an instant 
and that our intelligence, which is some spiritual generation, necessarily 
43 Castellani, Aduersus M. Tullii Ciceronis academicas quaestiones, 89–90.
44 Giulio Castellani, In libros Aristotelis de humano intellectu disputationes (Venice, 1568), 
37v: “De triplici intelligendi actu, neque intellectionem nostrum fieri in instanti posse, sed 
postulare semper aliquid temporis.”
45 Castellani, De humano intellectu, 38v: “Sive enim simpliciter apprehendat res, sive compo-
nat & dividat, seu discurrat ipse, determinati aliquid temporis eius postulat intellectio, 
cum in instanti ulla intellectus nostri actio perfici nequeat.” The passage continues: “Quo-
niam, licet phantasma in temporis momento sui speciem producat in intellectum, ut 
etiam efficit color, eiusdem tamen specie functio, quæ intelligentia est, absque tempore 
absolui nequaquam potest; quod oculo similiter accidit, qui coloris speciem suscipit in 
instanti, & colorem deinde non cognoscit ac iudicat, nisi dederis huic aliquid temporis.”
46 Castellani, De humano intellectu, 40v: “Si tempus individuum, in quo supra dixerat percipi 
longitudinem, instans fuerit, quo pacto in duas hic secabitur partes, cum instans nec actu, 
nec potentia, ut diximus, in partes secari possit?”
47 Castellani, De humano intellectu, 40v: “ … ubi per tempus individuum minime instans, sed 
tempus unum actu continuum accipi manifesto perspexeris”; Castellani, De humano intel-
lectu, 41: “Alterum vero, quod nos animadvertere oportet, est eiusmodi obiecti cognitione, 
quæ ab anima proficiscitur; atque hæc absque temporis spatio perfici nequaquam potest.”
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requires some sort of time: since in our intellect and our other faculties of 
knowledge, leaving aside this first production of images and species that 
happens in an instant, we have judgment and knowledge of the object, 
which cannot be completed in a moment of time. This is quite clear in 
sense and imagination. Imagination, indeed, even if it is instantaneously 
moved by a phantasm, can hardly get to know it within an instant; it 
always requires some sort of time. I believe that anyone can experience it 
in oneself: to my mind, one cannot find anybody who has ever managed 
to perfectly and plainly perceive something in an instant with his imagi-
nation. As you may notice, it is the same in the judgment of the senses. 
We cannot see things going fast and speedily through our field of vision, 
when a projectile has been shot by this noisy and destructive military 
machine commonly called a cannon. Indeed, we are not given the time 
that is necessary for the judgment of our eyes to come up.48
Castellani seems to distinguish between two moments within perception: the 
instantaneous reception of a given and then a judgment giving birth to knowl-
edge and in particular to the identification of the perceived object.49 One can 
be ‘moved’ by the ‘species’ coming from it but one does not have time to see it 
at all. There is a dual process in our faculties where intellection as a kind of 
‘objecti cognitio’ necessarily comes after ‘objecti motio’. What Castellani means 
is that all cognitive acts are submitted to the same temporality and that instan-
taneousness is found only in the primitive and confused moment of percep-
tion. Castellani’s position therefore amounts to immersing the human intellect 
48 Castellani, De humano intellectu, 40: “Nemini autem mirum videri debet, quod naturalis 
generatio fiat in instanti, atque intelligentia nostra, quæ spiritualis est quædam generatio, 
necessario aliquid temporis postulet: quoniam in intellectu nostro, & cæteris cognitione 
viribus præditis, præter illam primam imaginum, specierumque productionem, quæ fit in 
instanti, iudicium deinde & cognitione obiecti reperitur, quæ perfici in temporis 
momento nequeunt. Hoc in sensu, & phantasia valde conspicuum est. Phantasia quidem, 
tametsi a phantasmate in instanti movetur, huius tamen in instanti cognitionem ea asse-
qui minime potest; sed aliquid semper temporis requirit. Quod quemvis hominem in se 
ipso equidem experiri crediderim; quippe qui nullum reperiri arbitror, qui hoc unquam 
fuerit consecutus, ut ullam rem in instanti perfecte planeque, imaginatione perciperit.
Idem prorsus in iudicio sensus animadvertes. Illa enim quæ oculorum nostrorum aciem 
cito ac celeriter transeunt, quod ex obstrepente, & omnia prosternente tormento illo, 
quod vulgo bombardam vocant, glans eiecta efficit, iccirco videre non possumus: quon-
iam nobis non datur id temporis, quod iudicium pustulat [sic] oculorum.”
49 This pattern is similar to the one found in medieval optics where aspectus and intuitio are 
neatly separated. See for instance Vitellio, Peri optikès, (Nuremberg, 1551), 69v: “Omnis 
visio fit vel per aspectum simplicem, vel per intuitionem diligentem.”
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and all its operations within duration. Other philosophers resisted such a radi-
cal interpretation of De Anima 3.6, and while broadly accepting Porzio’s and 
Castellani’s naturalistic turn, they defended a renewed conception of intellec-
tual instantaneousness.
4 The Instantaneousness of Sensation and Intellection: Montecatini’s 
Lectura De Mente Humana (1576)
Antonio Montecatini is one of these thinkers and clearly based his reading of 
Aristotle’s De Anima on Simplicius. He claims with Genua that the Aristotelian 
“indivisible time” should not be confused with an “instant” or a “moment of 
time” because it is “true time,”50 that is, “continuous and uninterrupted time.”51 
However, he openly denies Genua’s idea that when Aristotle wrote that extend-
ed objects are understood in indivisible time, he was dealing with dianoetic 
acts.52 Although it takes place in a divisible portion of time, the apprehension 
of quantities is noetic in nature since it bears on a simple and undivided con-
tent. But Montecatini even more clearly opposes Castellani’s treatment of the 
problem. Although he never mentions him in his survey of De Anima 3.6, his 
move is difficult to appreciate outside of this polemical context. Castellani in-
sists on the discrepancy between sensation and intellection, between ‘motion’ 
and ‘cognition,’ whereas Montecatini’s contention is that these operations oc-
cur in the same kind of temporality. Even though he seems to come back to the 
classical thesis that intellection of forms is instantaneous, Montecatini’s argu-
ments deserve a careful reading because they show a different understanding 
of the Aristotelian notions used by Castellani.
50 Antonio Montecatini, In eam partem III. Libri Aristotelis de Anima, quæ est de mente 
humana, lectura (Ferrara, 1576), 349.
51 Montecatini, De mente humana, 349.
52 Montecatini insists that apprehension of quantities is not to be confused with intellec-
tion of complex notions which always occurs in successive and then divided time. 
Although inferior, intellection of quanta is close to intellection of forms. See Montecatini, 
De mente humana, 344: “Omnino autem mihi acriter cogitanti media quædam esse hæc 
forma videtur inter intellectionem formarum, & eam secundi modi, quæ est compositio 
notionum: quamvis ad illam propius accedat, nam partim similis est utriusque earum & 
partim dissimilis. Quod enim tempore fiat, quod dividua sit, habeatque partes tam ipsa, 
quam obiectum illius saltem potestate; ab intellectione formarum degenerat, speciem-
que sumit intellectionis secundi modi. Quod vero & id, quod comprehenditur, & ipsamet 
simplex sit, & individua, & una, quodque non tès dianoias sit actio, sed tou nou; in primo 
genere reponitur.” 
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Montecatini sets out a series of four justifications to support the idea that 
the intellection of forms occurs in an instant: from Aristotle’s own words (argu-
ment 1), from experience (argument 2), from the senses (argument 3) and from 
“the nature of causes of intellection” (argument 4). Arguments 2 and 3 are par-
ticularly intriguing. They are explicitly directed against Genua (who, however, 
does not seem to hold the position Montecatini attributes to him, at least in his 
survey of De Anima 3.6) and another scholar, Vincenzo Maggi. 53 He reproaches 
them for “not paying attention to the fact that all forms are understood and 
grasped by the intellect in a moment of time, even though one can remain as 
much as one wants and even a long time in the use and contemplation of 
forms.”54 Montecatini claims not only that intellection is instantaneous but 
also that this instantaneousness corresponds to a true experience or feeling. 
Argument 3 reinforces that idea: from the superiority of the intellect to the 
senses, Montecatini infers that if sensation is instantaneous and happens “in 
an indivisible time” as explained in De Anima 3.2 (426b 29–427a 5),55 then in-
tellection must also be instantaneous and the expression “indivisible time” has 
the same meaning in both cases. Montecatini’s argument is all the more con-
vincing since Aristotle, when describing the process of intellection in De Ani-
ma 3.7, explicitly compares science and sensation; he insists that they entail a 
“motion of a distinct kind” (De Anima 3.7, 431a 6), which is indeed different 
from motion in physical substances. Montecatini develops this point in argu-
ment 4 where he emphasizes the difference between progressive and instanta-
neous change in Aristotle’s Physics.56 He had insisted earlier on the analogy 
with natural philosophy, stressing the fact that intellectual time depends on 
the motion of spiritual things as tightly as physical time depends on the mo-
tion of bodies.57 Here is the content of argument 4:
53 Montecatini, De mente humana, 349. See Genua, In tres libros Aristotelis de anima, 163–64. 
Vincenzo Maggi (1498–1564) taught natural philosophy in Ferrara and had Castellani as a 
pupil. It has been noticed that Castellani “had derived [his De humano intellectu] from a 
commentary of Maggi on the third book of De anima”: see History of Italian Philosophy, 
ed. Eugenio Garin, vol. I, transl. Giorgio Pinton (Amsterdam-New York, 2008), 363. See 
also Castellani, De humano intellectu, 2.
54 Montecatini, De mente humana, 349: “Cur se non attendunt momento temporis singulas 
formas comprehendentes, atque intelligentes; etsi in functione earum, contempla-
tioneque possunt, quoad voluerint vel ad longum tempus permanere?”
55 See also Aristotle’s De Sensu (for instance 447 b 17–19; 448 a 1; 448 b 19–20; 449 a 2–3).
56 See Michel Crubellier, “On Generation and Corruption I. 9,” in Aristotle’s On Generation 
and Corruption I, ed. Franz de Haas and  Jaap Mansfeld (Oxford, 2004), 284–85.
57 When commenting on the assertion that “time is also both divisible and indivisible in the 
same sense as length,” Montecatini adds, “Ut vero corporeo in motu IIII & VI Physicarum 
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The form insofar as it is of that kind [i.e. intelligible] and not continuous 
is unqualifiedly indivisible; the mind comprehending it is unqualifiedly 
indivisible too: therefore (following the fifth and sixth books of Physics, in 
perfect similitude with this bodily motion that happens in a moment, 
namely generation and corruption, as we declared in our resolution), it is 
necessary that the form be comprehended and understood by the mind 
in an unqualifiedly indivisible time as well, which is a moment of time. 
That claim can be confirmed from an a minori argument. Indeed, if bodily 
generation can be completed in a moment, how much more is this the 
case with spiritual generation, which is more perfect, and less entangled 
with matter which has time as a property?58
Aristotle argues, indeed, that when something changes, it instantaneously 
changes into something else and that the time in which such a transformation 
takes place is an atomic and indivisible moment. “It is clear that that which 
passes out of existence or comes into existence must do so at an indivisible 
moment” (Physics, 6.5, 236 a 6–7): A when it becomes B either is A or B; if it is 
A, then it has not changed; if it is B, then it has already changed. Therefore “the 
thing that has been changed must already exist as the thing into which it has 
been changed” (235 b 27–28). That conception is connected with another claim 
according to which the beginning of a motion is not a motion but an instanta-
neous event, as John Philoponus had already pointed out. But it also echoes an 
important argument in Aristotle’s analysis of sensation, namely that there are 
motions without genesis and that sensations “involve no process of becoming, 
but exist without any such process” (De sensu, 6, 446b 4). Here Montecatini 
uses the same arguments as Castellani, but whereas the former considers im-
mediate apprehension, especially in the case of knowledge, as incomplete, the 
sequebatur continuatio, divisioque temporis, continuationem, ac divisionem rei, quæ 
moveretur: sic quoque in intelligentia, quæ est motus spiritalis, ut in resolutionibus dice-
bam, conveniens est, ex rei, quæ intelligitur divisione, continuationeque pendere con-
tinuationem, & divisionem temporis”: Montecatini, De mente humana, 344.
58 Montecatini, De mente humana, 349: “Novissime, & est ratio, quæ ex hoc textu sumitur, 
forma qua huiusmodi est, & non qua continua, est simpliciter individua; simpliciter 
etiam individua est mens, quæ illam comprehendit: ergo (quemadmodum ex Physicis V & 
VI similitudine perfecta motionis corporeæ, quæ momento sit, idest ortus & interitus in 
resolutione declaravimus) necesse est, ut in tempore etiam simpliciter individuo, quod 
est momentum temporis, forma comprehendatur a mente, atque intelligatur. Confirmari 
potest hæc ratio per locum a minori. Nam si absolui momento potest generatio corporea; 
quanto magis poterit spiritalis, quæ est perfectior quam illa, minusque implicata cum 
materia, cuius materiæ proprium est tempus?”
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latter holds that instantaneousness is a true aspect of human experience and 
that it qualifies sensation and intellection in the same way. The Aristotelian 
conception of sensation helps support the view that intellection is not a tem-
poral event, at least in Castellani’s sense, and that it is different from the atem-
porality of eveternity as well as the coming-to-be of natural substances.
5 Francesco Piccolomini’s Temporal Dualism
Although he is best known for his Comprehensive Philosophy of Morals and his 
lifelong rivalry with Jacopo Zabarella, his colleague at the University of Padua,59 
Francesco Piccolomini also took part in the debate on ‘indivisible time’ and 
gave a valuable commentary on De Anima 3.6 in his In tres libros Aristotelis de 
anima lucidissima expositio of 1602. Some of his arguments had already been 
formulated in the fifth part of his Libri ad Scientiam de Natura (1597). Piccolo-
mini clearly endorses the naturalistic approach that was developed by some of 
his contemporaries. He offers what can be considered as a middle position in 
the early modern debate over the time of the intellect: trying to reconcile the 
view that “spiritual action is accomplished in an instant” and the opposite 
claim that “intellection is our action and we are subject to time.”60
To the question “whether the first operation of the mind concerns indivisi-
bles and is done in an indivisible time,” Piccolomini answers that the intellect 
always apprehends indivisibles even if they are not always pure indivisibles 
but actually undivided notions like quantities.61 There is nothing original here. 
What is less ordinary is the way he solves the second part of the question. He 
59 See Jill Kraye, “Francesco Piccolomini,” in Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philo-
sophical Texts: Volume One, Moral Philosophy, ed. Jill Kraye (Cambridge, 1997), 68. See also 
Artemio Enzo Baldini, “Per la biografia di Francesco Piccolomini,” Rinascimento, series II, 
20 (1980), 389–420. 
60 Francesco Piccolomini, In tres libros Aristotelis de anima lucidissima expositio (Venice, 
1602), 181v: “Apparet id facere momento, tum quia actio spiritalis momento fit, ut patet de 
Visu, tum insuper, quia Mens est individua, & simul tota, quare similiter eius actio, tum 
tertio, quia rei essentia individua est, tum quarto, quia actio perfecta est tota simul, & non 
est motus qui est actus imperfectus, intellectio autem est actus & actio perfecta. Ex 
adverso, intelligere est actio nostra, nos autem subjicimur tempori, & ut intelligamus 
præsertim latentiora, egemus ocio, & tempore.”
61 Francesco Piccolomini, Naturæ totius universi scientia perfecta et philosophica (Frankfurt, 
1628), 1830: “An prima operatio Mentis fit indivisibilium, tempore indivisibili, & simul 
unius obiecti tantum”; Piccolomini, Naturæ totius universi scientia, 1830: “Semper itaque 
mens est indivisibilium.” 
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seems to support the claim that all cognitive acts, even those bearing on es-
sences, have a certain duration:
I say that occurring in an indivisible time is twofold, either in a poten-
tially indivisible time, that is in a moment, or in an actually indivisible 
time, that is in a continuous & undivided time. Assuming that, I say three 
things. First, the convenient application of a faculty to an object occurs in 
some continuous and undivided time. Aristotle rightly says in his book 
On Memory and Reminiscence [De Memoria 1, 450a 6–7] that we do not 
understand anything without continuum and time.62 For example, even 
though we see in a moment, nonetheless we do not see a projectile shot 
by a catapult because of its fast motion, since there cannot be any proxi-
mate application of our faculty.63
The military example is visibly borrowed from Castellani. The idea that per-
ceptive and intellectual acts share the same pattern reminds the reader of both 
Castellani’s and Montecatini’s positions. But Piccolomini understands it in 
quite different manner: while Castellani says that one has a primitive image of 
a thing but not the time to see it – that is, to judge – Piccolomini argues that 
one does not have time to apply the faculty of vision and hence one does not 
even have a first perception of the projectile. The consequence is that, accord-
ing to Piccolomini, one needs time to get a first perception before judging, 
whereas in the case of Castellani one has first a confused perception and then 
one needs time to make a judgment about what is perceived. Thus, we can say 
that intellection occurs in continuous time insofar as it depends on a faculty 
that has to be applied to an object. But if considered in its own right, the act of 
intelligence, which Piccolomini also calls a “judgment,” “occurs in a moment”:
Since the faculty is indivisible, as it is said in the twelfth book of Meta-
physics, text 51 [12.10, 1075a 5–10], its object (as we have seen) is indivisi-
ble. That is the reason why it is necessarily apprehended in an indivisible 
62 Aristotle does indeed say at De memoria 450a 6–7 that “it is impossible to think of any-
thing without continuity, or to think of things which are timeless except in terms of time.” 
63 Piccolomini, Naturæ totius universi scientia, 1830–31: “Dico, fieri tempore indivisibili, 
dupliciter contingere, vel in indivisibili potestate, hoc est momento, vel in indivisibili 
actu, hoc est, tempore continuato, & non diviso. Quo assumpto, tria profero, primum est, 
congruens applicatio facultatis ad obiectum fit tempore aliquo continuato, & non diviso, 
ita recte dicitur in lib. De Memor. & Reminiscentia, nos nil intelligere sine continuo & 
tempore; veluti etiam quamvis momento videamus, tamen pilam tormento bellico expul-
sam, ob velocem motum non videmus, quia non potest fieri congruens applicatio.”
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time, namely in a moment. As Aristotle teaches us in the third book of De 
Anima, text 28 [3.7, 431a 5], the sense is neither affected nor altered by a 
sensible object, and it is another species of motion; indeed motion is the 
action of the imperfect, but action unqualifiedly considered is action of 
the perfect. Aristotle indicates that the action of feeling is perfect and 
accomplished all at once as Simplicius declared in his exposition, and 
also Averroes. Because of that, Aristotle has said in his Metaphysics, text 
22 [9. 10, 1051b 23–26] that the object can be touched or not touched – 
touching it is truth, not touching is falsity – and that the touch of indi-
visibles is indivisible. These things I have said are true of the mind, and 
they are also somehow true of sense: indeed, the connection of the fac-
ulty with the object needs some undivided time, when it is about things 
conjoined with time, but judgment occurs in a moment and at the end of 
time.64
The phrase ‘in termino temporis’ is equivalent to ‘in momento temporis’ or ‘in 
nunc temporis’ and means nothing other than an instant. It comes from the 
idea that neither the end nor the beginning of a time, as we saw earlier, is prop-
erly a time in Aristotelian physics. For Piccolomini, instantaneousness does 
not qualify any ‘motion of the object’ that would be prior to intellectual acts. 
While the application of the intellectual faculty takes time, judgment or ‘ap-
prehension’ instantaneously occurs once the faculty has been properly applied 
to the object, at least in the case of ‘objects conjoined with time.’ There is in-
deed an ambiguity here: does it mean that intellections bearing on non-tem-
poral objects, like essences, do not need any previous application of the mind 
and that we reach them with no delay? Another problem concerns the notion 
of application. Piccolomini insists twice that the application of a faculty must 
occur in an actually undivided time. But he holds a different position in his De 
64 Piccolomini, Naturæ totius universi scientia, 1831: “Quia facultas est indivisibilis, ut dicitur 
duodecimo Metaphysicæ, 51, obiectum (ut patuit) est indivisibile, quare est necesse, ut 
apprehendatur tempore indivisibili, hoc est momento, hoc nos docet Aristot. in 3 de 
Anima, & ob id in com. 28 inquit, sensitivum a sensibili non pati, nec alterari, & eam esse 
aliam speciem motus, nam motus imperfecti actio est, quæ vero simpliciter actio, alia est 
quæ perfecti, indicans sentire esse actionem perfectam, & totam simul, ut declarat in eius 
expositione Simplicius, necnon Averroes. & ob idipsum Aristoteles Metaphysicæ, 22 dixit: 
Obiectum vel attingi, vel non attingi, attingere illud, verum est, non attingere falsum, tac-
tus autem indivisibilium, indivisibilis est. Hæc quæ dixi præsertim vera sunt de mente, 
modo etiam aliquo vera sunt de sensu: nam connexio facultatis cum obiecto, eget tem-
pore aliquo non diviso, cum sit rerum coniunctarum cum tempore, iudicium tamen fit 
momento & in termino temporis.” 
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Anima commentary, saying that such an application cannot be “all at once”: it 
necessarily comes “through a succession because of its link with phantasia.”65 
The situation described by Piccolomini is probably different in each work: in 
the commentary he is dealing with the human mind insofar as it is confronted 
with “hidden things (latentiora)” and is compelled to investigate; in the Naturæ 
totius universi scientia, the object is, so to speak, a given and the application of 
the intellectual faculty is not hindered by any obstacle. But nevertheless it re-
quires some time while apprehension, which amounts to the actualization of 
that same faculty, is immediately accomplished.
A third stage of the intellective process must be taken into account and may 
help to clarify Piccolomini’s purpose:
I add a third point. While we are in the process of knowing a certain 
essence and are versed in the inspection and contemplation of it, it is 
said to happen in an actually indivisible act, that is undivided, and the 
Philosopher uses that way of speaking, ‘actually indivisible’, because, 
even if we have been engaged in the contemplation of a simple essence 
for one hour, yet such a contemplation is all at once at every moment, 
because it is a perfect act and not imperfect as motion, just as the sun 
goes on illuminating the air for hours and does it in indivisible time 
because its illumination is entire and perfect at every single moment.66
Piccolomini deals here with what he will call “conservation of judgment” in his 
De Anima commentary, that is to say when “we persist in the contemplation of 
an object,” which undoubtedly takes time.67 But, even though it is temporal, 
such a process entails something instantaneous. The analogy between illumi-
nation and contemplation is quite telling: the immediate transmission of light 
through the diaphanous medium is used in chapter 6 of Aristotle’s De Sensu 
65 Piccolomini, In tres libros Aristotelis de anima, 181v: “Nam pro applicatione ita requiritur 
tempus, ut non sit tota simul, sed fiat successione quadam ob nexum cum Phantasia.”
66 Piccolomini, Naturæ totius universi Scientia, 1831: “Addo tertio, dum noverimus essentiam 
aliquam, & versamur in eius inspectione & contemplatione, id dicitur fieri tempore indi-
visibilli actu, hoc est non diviso, & utitur Philosophus hoc loquendi modo, indivisibili 
actu: quia quamvis per horam versemur in continuata contemplatione unius simplicis 
esse essentiæ, ea tamen contemplatio in quovis momento est tota simul, quia est actus 
perfectus, non autem imperfectus, ut motus, veluti dum sol per continuatas horas aerem 
illustrat, dicitur id facere tempore indivisibili; quia ea illustratio singulis momentis est 
tota, & perfecta.”
67 Piccolomini, In tres libros Aristotelis de anima, 181v. 
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(446 a 25-b 13)68 as another model for the instantaneousness of sensation. Pic-
colomini insists that illumination has an objective or cosmic duration (‘for 
hours’) but considered as one act, having no variation in itself, it must be said 
to occur in an “actually indivisible moment.”69 Illumination is neither a physi-
cal motion nor a successive process composed of multiple flashes of light: it is 
one flash lasting for a definite period of time. It is the same with contempla-
tion: the instantaneous apprehension is maintained through time and for that 
very reason it cannot be one in the purest sense of the word. It only has the 
oneness of an enduring psychological event, even if the very content of con-
templation is something alien to extension and duration.70
Piccolomini’s treatment of contemplation is instructive: just like the intel-
lection bearing on divisible objects, it entails a certain relationship to time be-
cause the conservation of the intellectual act depends on the temporal 
functioning of a faculty. According to him, that is the key to De Anima 3.6:
When Aristotle said that the intelligible is understood in undivided time, 
he meant the apprehension along with its conservation and contempla-
tion, and he used that way of speaking, saying that it occurs in an indivis-
ible or not divided time, because, as I said, in every moment intellection 
is all at once71
68 See also De Anima 2. 7 (418 b 20–419 a 6).
69 Aristotle insists on that point in Physics 4.11 218b 21–23, with the famous example of the 
Sardinian sleepers: “For when we experience no changes of consciousness, or, if we do, are 
not aware of them, no time seems to have passed.”
70 Piccolomini also considers the objection that the intellection of an essence is not neces-
sarily accomplished all at once; Piccolomini, Naturæ totius universi scientia, 1831: “Non-
nunquam essentiam aliquam primo noscimus in parte, ut noscendo genus eius, mox 
exacte noscendo postremam differentiam, quare apprehendimus indivisible cum divi-
sione, & ille actus non est unus, & perfectus, sed ex imperfecto tendit in perfectionem.” 
He gives the following answer : “Respondeo, dum id facimus, perinde disponimur, ac dum 
continuum in partes dividimus, & partes seorsum distincto tempore indivisibiliter appre-
hendimus, nam seorsum considerando & genus, & differentiam, eas consideramus ut 
essentias distinctas, & quamlibet apprehendimus indivisibiliter, tunc tamen essentiam 
rei dicimur attingere, dum attingimus differentiam postremam, quæ est totum id, quod 
proprie est, & id facimus momento.” He further confirms that discourse and reasoning are 
made “ex indivisibili ad indivisibile”: Piccolomini, Naturæ totius universi scientia, 1836.
71 Piccolomini, In tres libros Aristotelis de anima, 181v: “Aristot. inquiens intelligibile intelligi 
tempore individuo, denotavit apprehensionem cum eius conservatione, & contempla-
tione, & usus est eo loquendi modo, dicendo, quod fiat tempore indivisibili, sive non 
diviso, quia ut dixi in quovis eius momento intellectio est tota.”
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Considered as a whole, intellection is made ‘in undivided time’ since it con-
tains a complex structure including application and conservation. But it also 
occurs ‘in true indivisible time’ as long as apprehension is done all at once at 
every moment within the very time of knowledge. Contrary to Montecatini, 
who classically distinguishes between the intellection of the pure indivisibles 
(in an instant) and of the actually undivided (in continuous time), Piccolomini 
claims that there is something instantaneous at the core of every intellection, 
namely ‘judgment’. The divisibility of the intellectual act does not depend on 
the nature of its content, but rather on the way the psychological process of 
intellection is carried out.
6 Conclusion
“Alexandrianism” is a concept coined by Ernest Renan, used to define “the 
close relation between the denial of the immortality of the soul and the ‘natu-
ralistic’ approach to nature in the tradition of Aristotle’s De Generatione et 
corruption.”72 An interesting aspect of the debate over intellectual time is in-
deed the attempt to think of intellection as a temporal reality, produced by the 
mind. In that particular framework, sense-perception and intellection are not 
opposed because they are understood as referring to separate realities or expe-
riences, but seen as natural events capable of being compared and described 
with the same theoretical tools. From Porzio to Piccolomini, the Aristotelian 
concept of ‘act’ or energeia appears as a key notion, implying a renewed de-
scription of the psychology of faculties and their mutual relationships. In such 
a context, time is no longer conceived only as a feature of motion (in terms of 
Aristotle’s Physics alone), but also as an aspect of acts, either mental, corporeal, 
or involving both mind and body, such as sensation, intellection or judgment. 
Because these acts occupy a very short lapse of time or are said to be instanta-
neous, they are sometimes considered to be different components of one ac-
tivity developing in a temporal sequence rather than independent operations. 
Although they disagree over the meaning of Aristotelian concepts, Castellani, 
Montecatini and Piccolomini give detailed descriptions of the different stages 
leading to the act of intellection.
72 Eckhard Kessler, “Metaphysics or Empirical Science? The Two Faces of Aristotelian Natu-
ral Philosophy in the Sixteenth Century,” in Renaissance Readings of the Corpus Aristoteli-
cum, ed. Marianne Pade (Copenhagen, 2001), 100. See also Eckhard Kessler, “Alexander of 
Aphrodisias and his Doctrine of the Soul. 1400 Years of Lasting Significance,” Early Science 
and Medicine, 16 (2011), 1–93.
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If we take a broader view, we can also stress the importance of the notion of 
‘instantaneousness’ in the Aristotelian psychology of cognition. It is most obvi-
ous in renaissance philosophers like Genua or Montecatini who reject the idea 
that mental acts, although not eviternal, may have a natural duration. Sensa-
tion and intellection are both instantaneous and preserved from the temporal-
ity of becoming. But this tight relationship between instantaneousness and 
mental activity can be found elsewhere. It is frequently used to account for the 
operations performed by the human mind. For instance, philosophers claim-
ing that the intellect can know many things at once sometimes argue that one 
intellectual act, like a judgment, can entail several operations of the mind and 
that those operations are achieved ‘in an instant’.73 A similar use of instanta-
neousness is to be found in the Renaissance and early modern discussion over 
the status of enthymematic reasoning.74 In this case, the discussion bears on 
the question whether the conclusion and the minor premise of a syllogism can 
be known together in the same instant, as Aristotle seems to suggest in Poste-
rior Analytics 1.1 (71a 17–24).
Despite all this, we should not overestimate the impact of these conceptions 
on the early modern philosophy of time. If we look at Aristotelian discussions 
on this topic at the beginning of the seventeenth century, it clearly appears 
that the theological model of angelic thought is still prevalent in most theo-
logical and philosophical works at this time. The Coimbra commentary on De 
Anima argues that the structure of the human intellect is ‘circular’ and atem-
poral and must be contrasted with the ‘linear’ structure of sense.75 And when 
Descartes claims in 1648 that intellectual time knows some sort of ‘succession’ 
73 Some indications on this point can be found in Olivier Dubouclez, “Plura simul intelligere. 
Éléments pour une histoire du débat médiéval et renaissant sur la simultanéité des actes 
de l’intellect,” in Recherches de théologie et de philosophie médiévale, 81/2 (2014), 249–85.
74 On the instantaneous grasp of syllogistic propositions, see Collegium Conimbricensis, In 
universam Aristotelis logicam (Coimbra, 1604), 162–164; Collegium Conimbricensis, In uni-
versam Aristotelis dialecticam (Cologne, 1611), 460–464.
75 Collegium Conimbricensis, Commentarii in tres libros De anima Aristotelis (Cologne, 
1629), 409–10: “Docet vero animam humanam cognoscere quidem rem singularem, 
eamque sensibilem sensitiva potentia: universalem vero vel potentia separabili, id est 
diversa realiter, vel re quidem una, sed secundum rationem diversa: & quæ se habeat ad 
seipsam ut linea inflexa ad semetipsam rectam. Sicut enim cum inflexa magnitudo in 
rectum porrigitur, eademet linea, quae antea flexa, seu curva erat, sit recta, neque tamen 
a se realiter, sed ratione tantum differt: ita fortassis (nec enim hic propositam controver-
siam ex toto dirimit) sese haberet facultas, qua universale, & qua singulare sensibile cog-
noscitur.” On the interpretation of this passage, see Edwards, “Time, Duration and the 
Soul,” 115.
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and is no different from the physical time of corporeal substances, Antoine 
Arnauld reproaches him for sustaining a very uncommon position, which con-
tradicts most philosophers and theologians.76 In this respect, it is important to 
emphasize that the rise of Alexandrianism in the course of the sixteenth cen-
tury is linked to a specific cultural context. Since mortalists no longer consider 
the body as an instrument of the soul, potentially detachable from it, but, in 
line with Galen’s psychology, as the necessary basis of everything mental and 
intellectual, Aristotelian scholars were invited to emancipate their philosophi-
cal and psychological reflection from the authority of theology. Mortalism en-
couraged the development of a ‘purified’ Aristotelian model whose defenders 
were led to read Aristotle and theorize without the usual limitations and re-
quirements imposed by faith. Even to some opponents of Pomponazzi, this 
appeared to be a sound way of doing philosophy. Francesco Piccolomini is a 
good example of this trend: while he is an open defender of the immortality of 
the soul, he develops his reflection on intellectual time within the framework 
originated by Alexandrist scholars like Porzio or Castellani.77 It is quite under-
standable that the topic of time would receive special attention within that 
context. Given that the conceptual justification of eternity or immortality, 
linked to the eschatological aspects of Christianity, has always been a major 
concern for theologians, describing the relationship of human thought to time 
apart from the model of separated substances was undeniably a new and chal-
lenging enterprise.
76 See René Descartes, Principia philosophiae, I, § 57, in Œuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles 
Adam and Paul Tannery, 11 vols. (Paris, 1996), 8: 27; Arnauld to Descartes, June 3, 1648: 
Œuvres de Descartes, 5: 188–89; Descartes to Arnauld, June 4, 1648: Œuvres de Descartes, 5: 
193; Descartes to Arnauld, July 29, 1648; Œuvres de Descartes, 5: 223. See Jean-Luc Solère, 
“Descartes et les discussions médiévales sur le temps,” 335–41.
77 See Martin, Subverting Aristotle, 81, also 54–59. On Piccolomini’s arguments in favour of 
the immortality of the soul, see Emily Michael, “Renaissance Theories of Body, Soul and 
Mind,” in Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from 
Antiquity to Enlightenment, ed. John P. Wright and Paul Potter (Oxford, 2002), 161–62.
